Some
notes
from
reading
and
research

Hugo Mercier

I’m reading Not Born Yesterday The Science of Who We Trust and What We Believe, Hugo Mercier, 2019: notes.

My country right or wrong

As one Russian friend, who has long left the country put it: ‘It is a terrible reflex: it’s my country and my duty is to defend it even if it is wrong. I must defend my country. You cannot imagine how deep and powerful this reflex is. Even those who don’t think this war is a good idea – say “we are wrong but we cannot lose”. Do you remember the post of [name redacted] that I sent you? It is my country and I wish it to win. Why can Americans commit war crimes and stay without any sanctions but we cannot? [Russia’s war, McGlynn] (my emphasis)

Russians are not unique in that regard. But I think it is indicative of a value that can be felt stronger or weaker.

I know that patriots all over the world stand by the motto “My country right or wrong”, but I’m pretty sure that’s wrong.

Possible heuristic: if you say: “My country right or wrong”—you yourself are wrong.

That sounds like a reproach to myself

Making a conscious decision not to do anything when you recognise – or have the capacity to recognise – the evil done in your name is hardly more morally upstanding than blindly supporting something you have no reason to question. [Russia’s war, McGlynn]

That sounds like a reproach to myself.

the Russian liberal ends where Ukraine begins

... I do not find Aleksandr Dmitriev’s response surprising. The issue is not that he will not choose a side – he has, in his own words, chosen the Western side. The issue is that among the constituency of people to which he belongs – incredibly intelligent people with liberal values and firm morals who came of age in the USSR – it is hard to find many that view Ukraine as part of the Western spectrum.

The disconnect between (some) Russian liberals and Ukrainians has caused bitterness. Nobody is more disappointed in, and less hopeful of, Russian capacity to rise up than the Ukrainians. Perhaps the Ukrainian saying that ‘the Russian liberal ends where Ukraine begins’ is a truism but it is one that has had frequent cause to be pronounced. Explanations that will convince a Western audience – that Russians cannot be expected to protest in such a frightening environment, all they can do is leave – are given short shrift by Ukrainians who have staged two revolutions over the last twenty years, in the face of brutality and snipers, and who returned to fight in their tens of thousands from working abroad. Sasha Danylyuk, adviser to General Zaluzhnyi, the Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and adviser to the head of the Foreign Intelligence Services of Ukraine, perceives many Russian liberals as sharing the Kremlin’s chauvinistic and dismissive attitudes towards Ukrainians as ‘little brothers. They are so arrogant and condescending, even among liberals, this is just their attitude, the Russian attitude, they do not see Ukraine as really abroad, as a real country, we are just a joke to them.’(Interview with Oleksandr Danylyuk via phone, 8 June 2022.) [Russia’s war, McGlynn] (my emphasis)

Russia’s War, by Jade McGlynn

I’ve finished The Psychology of Nationalism and am now turning my attention to Russia’s War, by Jade McGlynn (2023).

It starts by reminding me that the same images are being used to tell completely opposite stories, and that Russians have their reasons for believing their version. I know this book is going to make me depressed, but I’m gambling that McGlynn can learn me something that I can use.

I’ll put some raw notes here and highlights in the main timeline.

Banal Nationalism

Today I learned about the myriad of ways our nationalism is reinforced, often without us even being aware of it. First noted and named by Michael Billig: Banal Nationalism.

Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995).

For convenience, I’m going to copy most of the Wikipedia article and two Amazon comments below. (It is tempting to start reading the book right away, but that would distract too much from what I’m currently reading.)

Banal nationalism refers to everyday representations of a nation, which build a sense of shared national identity.[1]

The term is derived from English academic, Michael Billig's 1995 book of the same name and is intended to be understood critically. Billig's book has been described as 'the fourth most cited work on nationalism ever published'.[2] Billig devised the concept of 'banal nationalism' to highlight the routine and often unnoticed ways that established nation-states are reproduced from day to day.[3]

The concept has been highly influential, particularly within the discipline of political geography, with continued academic interest since the book's publication in 1995.[4] Today the term is used primarily in academic discussion of identity formation, geopolitics, and the nature of nationalism in contemporary political culture.[5]

Examples of banal nationalism include the use of flags in everyday contexts, sporting events, national songs, symbols on money,[6] popular expressions and turns of phrase, patriotic clubs, the use of implied togetherness in the national press, for example, the use of terms such as the prime minister, the weather, our team, and divisions into "domestic" and "international" news. Many of these symbols are most effective because of their constant repetition, and almost subliminal nature. Banal nationalism is often created via state institutions such as schools.[7]

It can contribute to bottom-up processes of nation-building.[8]

Michael Billig's primary purpose in coining the term was to clearly differentiate everyday, endemic nationalism from extremist variants. He argued that the academic and journalistic focus on extreme nationalists, independence movements, and xenophobes in the 1980s and 1990s obscured the strength of contemporary nationalism, by implying that nationalism was a fringe ideology rather than a dominant theme in contemporary political culture.[4][5]

Billig noted the almost unspoken assumption of the utmost importance of the nation in political discourse of the time, for example in the calls to protect Kuwait during the Gulf War, or to take action in the U.S. after the September 11 attacks. He argues that the "hidden" nature of modern nationalism makes it a very powerful ideology, partially because it remains largely unexamined and unchallenged, yet remains the basis for powerful political movements, and most political violence in the world today.

Banal nationalism should not be thought of as a weak form of nationalism, but the basis for "dangerous nationalisms".[9]

However, in earlier times, calls to the "nation" were not as important, when religion, monarchy or family might have been invoked more successfully to mobilize action. He also uses the concept to dispute post-modernist claims that the nation-state is in decline, noting particularly the continued hegemonic power of American nationalism.

1. Michel Billig, Banal Nationalism. 1995, London: Sage, p. 6.
2. Michael Skey and Marco Antonsich, Everyday Nationhood: theorising culture, identity and belonging after Banal Nationalism. 2017, London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 1.
3. Michel Billig, Banal Nationalism. 1995, London: Sage, p. 6.
4. Koch, Nathalie; Anssi Paasi (September 2016). "Banal Nationalism 20 years on: Re-thinking, re-formulating and re-contextualizing the concept". Political Geography. 54: 1–6. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2016.06.002.
5. Sophie Duchesne, 'Who's afraid of Banal Nationalism', Nations and Nationalism, 2018, 24, pp. 841-856.
6. Penrose, Jan (November 2011). "Designing the nation. Banknotes, banal nationalism and alternative conceptions of the state". Political Geography. 30 (8): 429–440. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.09.007.
7. Piller, Ingrid (12 May 2017). "The banal nationalism of intercultural communication advice". Archived from the original on 12 May 2017.
8. Mylonas, Harris; Tudor, Maya (11 May 2021). "Nationalism: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know". Annual Review of Political Science. 24 (1): 109–132. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-101841. Retrieved 27 September 2021. Wade, Lisa (4 July 2014). "Banal Nationalism". Sociological Images. Retrieved 16 October 2019.

In contrast to the oft-mentioned "hot" nationalisms which seem to plague far-off or obscure places like the Balkans, the Caucuses, etc., Billig introduces the concept of "banal" nationalism to refer to nationalism and the way this form of identity politics is reinforced in stable, affluent and apparently "anational" societies, such as Great Britain or the United States.

This is not a consideration of fringe groups, but of societies as a whole. Billig conducts an exemplary analysis into how identification with one's nation or country is reinforced on a daily basis in the most subtle and unnoticeable (and thus banal) manner: the weather maps in newspapers or on television which show one's country highlighted in a different color, currency or postage stamp containing patriotic motifs, pledging allegiance to the flag every morning by school children, etc. Billig's point is that this everyday, almost unconscious intake of psychologically loaded signs, symbols and signals can be one factor in explaining how easily people come to adopt irrational openly "patriotic" ways of thinking in times of crisis, whether real or perceived (as anyone who lived in the U.S. during the Gulf War can attest to).

There is also a good critique of the dichotomy created between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism, in that those who insist on this dichotomy usually tend to view the former as "good" while the latter is definitely "bad." Billig points out that both have the potential to become dangerously irrational. (Comment by Edward Bosnar)

While I love the ideas and observations presented by Billig, he didn't seem to be putting too much thought into those who would be reading his book. I kept getting the impression that he had about 50 pages worth of content, but was required to write 150 pages in order to please his publisher. The bulk of the book is repeating the same things over again in different words and it is written in very dry language. He also seems to tell things in the wrong order. He'll go on and on about a conclusion he has, but wait several chapters before he actually tells you the reasoning he used to reach that conclusion.

Despite all that, he has a message worth hearing, and at least considering. He describes how nationalism is not something that exists only in extreme circumstances, but how it's a part of everyday life that citizens take for granted. Well worth a read. Or at least a skim. (Comment by layla)

[Reading The psychology of nationalism]

Currently reading the Psychology of Nationalism

I’m reading The Psychology of Nationalism, by Joshua Searle-White, 2001. I’ll put general info here, rough notes here, and highlights in the timeline.

Unreflective partisanship

The term “nationalism” might be confusing. Nationalism can be a good thing and a bad thing, which means that that the term can not be used without qualification. When George Orwell wrote about nationalism in 1945, he seems to have intended it to mean: “unreflective partisanship”. That is much more to the point.

The W. article on Orwell’s “Notes on Nationalism” gives a short summary of his thoughts on this topic: https://web.archive.org/web/20230606043801/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Notes_on_Nationalism