Some
notes
from
reading
and
research

Notes in response to Tim Fransen’s book In Our Time.

I’ve read In onze tijd, by Tim Fransen, and I’ve made a few initial notes on my main blog: “In onze tijd, Tim Fransen”.

More notes to follow here.

The following is taken from pp. 296-298; My emphasis:

Some will say that it is not possible at all to identify ourselves with humanity as a whole. That it is too big or too abstract. They will say: ‘It's all well and good for the John Lennons of this world to sing songs about “imagine all the people sharing all the world,” but the reality shows that people are not capable of seeing themselves as part of a global community’.

Personally, I am not convinced of this impossibility. Political scientist Benedict Anderson pointed out in his book Imagined Communities (1983): every community larger than that of a village is necessarily an imagined community. The more than seventeen million inhabitants of the Netherlands do not all know each other personally. This is even more true for larger countries, such as America with its more than three hundred million inhabitants, or India and China with more than a billion inhabitants. The shared national identity is based on a mental construct. In other words: it relies on imagination. Philosophically speaking, John Lennon was not far off with his 'imagine.' Our imagination does not balk at a few million more or less. Furthermore, consider this: the imaginative leap from a village (where you know almost everyone personally) to a nation (where you know almost no one personally) is proportionally much greater than the mental leap from a nation to the entire world. The point is that we tell the right story. Because communities are connected by stories: stories of adversity and trials, of (often unspoken) dark pages and glorious achievements; stories that together tell a creation history and provide a collective orientation towards the future.

These stories are usually told at the level of nations and peoples (or at the level of sports clubs that publish a booklet about 'seventy years of Swimming Club The Ducklings' on their anniversary). But our time just as much demands a larger, global story.

For example, the story of an astonishing coincidence of cosmic circumstances, and improbable strokes of luck in the origin of complex life, resulting in the appearance of self-conscious beings in a corner of the cosmic No Man's Land; beings who, over a period of many thousands of years, hundreds of successive generations, accumulated their knowledge to the point where not only a highly modern civilization was possible, but also unprecedented possibilities of (self) destruction. Shocked by its own technological and ecological superpowers - a period the human called 'the Crisis Era' - humanity eventually learned a wise lesson about peacefulness and mutual dependence.

In such a story, people are heirs to a collective history and allies in a struggle against common threats. (Ideally, this story is of course told with an epic string orchestra in the background.) But the only way such a collective story can be credibly told is if we make justice and meaningful solidarity our guiding principles. That is what it means to take ourselves seriously as one and the same political community. Only then will humanity be able to propel itself to great heights, instead of working against itself. And only in this way will humanity be able to extricate itself from the Crisis Era.

I find the above argument by Fransen appealing, and way back before I had read Jonathan Haidt, I would probably even have agreed with it. But the best I can say is that, indeed, in theory, this should be possible. Or as he himself writes: ‘Philosophically speaking...’.

In practice, there is a limit to what most people can imagine. Specifically: as soon as other people seem different, seem to have different (conflicting) values, and even worse, when those people seem to compete for resources, that limit of imagined unity is reached for, probably, a majority of people.

Fransen mentions India and China. Both are excellent examples for limits being reached. First, India only exists because Pakistan (including Bangladesh at the time) and India swapped large numbers of people. But even now Hindu nationalism is threatening the unity of what remains. As for China, part of it is relatively homogeneous, and the state uses harsh us versus them propaganda (against the US, against Japan) to artificially create more unity. But there are of course the Tibet and the Uyghurs. Interesting examples, India and China.

Rather then make a more complete argument myself, I simply point and link to a few of Haidt’s articles. (Oh BTW, the irony of Fransen using Lennon’s song ‘Imagine’. Haidt has been using it for a long time to identify the difference between ‘globalists and nationalists’; I’m sure Fransen knows that, he should have cited Haidt).

• Haidt, Jonathan. “When and Why Nationalism Beats Globalism.” The American Interest, vol. 12, no. 1, 2016, Web.
• Haidt, Jonathan. The Ethics of Globalism, Nationalism, and Patriotism, MINDING NATURE 9.3

Hugo Mercier

I’m reading Not Born Yesterday The Science of Who We Trust and What We Believe, Hugo Mercier, 2019: notes.

My country right or wrong

As one Russian friend, who has long left the country put it: ‘It is a terrible reflex: it’s my country and my duty is to defend it even if it is wrong. I must defend my country. You cannot imagine how deep and powerful this reflex is. Even those who don’t think this war is a good idea – say “we are wrong but we cannot lose”. Do you remember the post of [name redacted] that I sent you? It is my country and I wish it to win. Why can Americans commit war crimes and stay without any sanctions but we cannot? [Russia’s war, McGlynn] (my emphasis)

Russians are not unique in that regard. But I think it is indicative of a value that can be felt stronger or weaker.

I know that patriots all over the world stand by the motto “My country right or wrong”, but I’m pretty sure that’s wrong.

Possible heuristic: if you say: “My country right or wrong”—you yourself are wrong.

That sounds like a reproach to myself

Making a conscious decision not to do anything when you recognise – or have the capacity to recognise – the evil done in your name is hardly more morally upstanding than blindly supporting something you have no reason to question. [Russia’s war, McGlynn]

That sounds like a reproach to myself.

the Russian liberal ends where Ukraine begins

... I do not find Aleksandr Dmitriev’s response surprising. The issue is not that he will not choose a side – he has, in his own words, chosen the Western side. The issue is that among the constituency of people to which he belongs – incredibly intelligent people with liberal values and firm morals who came of age in the USSR – it is hard to find many that view Ukraine as part of the Western spectrum.

The disconnect between (some) Russian liberals and Ukrainians has caused bitterness. Nobody is more disappointed in, and less hopeful of, Russian capacity to rise up than the Ukrainians. Perhaps the Ukrainian saying that ‘the Russian liberal ends where Ukraine begins’ is a truism but it is one that has had frequent cause to be pronounced. Explanations that will convince a Western audience – that Russians cannot be expected to protest in such a frightening environment, all they can do is leave – are given short shrift by Ukrainians who have staged two revolutions over the last twenty years, in the face of brutality and snipers, and who returned to fight in their tens of thousands from working abroad. Sasha Danylyuk, adviser to General Zaluzhnyi, the Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and adviser to the head of the Foreign Intelligence Services of Ukraine, perceives many Russian liberals as sharing the Kremlin’s chauvinistic and dismissive attitudes towards Ukrainians as ‘little brothers. They are so arrogant and condescending, even among liberals, this is just their attitude, the Russian attitude, they do not see Ukraine as really abroad, as a real country, we are just a joke to them.’(Interview with Oleksandr Danylyuk via phone, 8 June 2022.) [Russia’s war, McGlynn] (my emphasis)

Russia’s War, by Jade McGlynn

I’ve finished The Psychology of Nationalism and am now turning my attention to Russia’s War, by Jade McGlynn (2023).

It starts by reminding me that the same images are being used to tell completely opposite stories, and that Russians have their reasons for believing their version. I know this book is going to make me depressed, but I’m gambling that McGlynn can learn me something that I can use.

I’ll put some raw notes here and highlights in the main timeline.

Banal Nationalism

Today I learned about the myriad of ways our nationalism is reinforced, often without us even being aware of it. First noted and named by Michael Billig: Banal Nationalism.

Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995).

For convenience, I’m going to copy most of the Wikipedia article and two Amazon comments below. (It is tempting to start reading the book right away, but that would distract too much from what I’m currently reading.)

Banal nationalism refers to everyday representations of a nation, which build a sense of shared national identity.[1]

The term is derived from English academic, Michael Billig's 1995 book of the same name and is intended to be understood critically. Billig's book has been described as 'the fourth most cited work on nationalism ever published'.[2] Billig devised the concept of 'banal nationalism' to highlight the routine and often unnoticed ways that established nation-states are reproduced from day to day.[3]

The concept has been highly influential, particularly within the discipline of political geography, with continued academic interest since the book's publication in 1995.[4] Today the term is used primarily in academic discussion of identity formation, geopolitics, and the nature of nationalism in contemporary political culture.[5]

Examples of banal nationalism include the use of flags in everyday contexts, sporting events, national songs, symbols on money,[6] popular expressions and turns of phrase, patriotic clubs, the use of implied togetherness in the national press, for example, the use of terms such as the prime minister, the weather, our team, and divisions into "domestic" and "international" news. Many of these symbols are most effective because of their constant repetition, and almost subliminal nature. Banal nationalism is often created via state institutions such as schools.[7]

It can contribute to bottom-up processes of nation-building.[8]

Michael Billig's primary purpose in coining the term was to clearly differentiate everyday, endemic nationalism from extremist variants. He argued that the academic and journalistic focus on extreme nationalists, independence movements, and xenophobes in the 1980s and 1990s obscured the strength of contemporary nationalism, by implying that nationalism was a fringe ideology rather than a dominant theme in contemporary political culture.[4][5]

Billig noted the almost unspoken assumption of the utmost importance of the nation in political discourse of the time, for example in the calls to protect Kuwait during the Gulf War, or to take action in the U.S. after the September 11 attacks. He argues that the "hidden" nature of modern nationalism makes it a very powerful ideology, partially because it remains largely unexamined and unchallenged, yet remains the basis for powerful political movements, and most political violence in the world today.

Banal nationalism should not be thought of as a weak form of nationalism, but the basis for "dangerous nationalisms".[9]

However, in earlier times, calls to the "nation" were not as important, when religion, monarchy or family might have been invoked more successfully to mobilize action. He also uses the concept to dispute post-modernist claims that the nation-state is in decline, noting particularly the continued hegemonic power of American nationalism.

1. Michel Billig, Banal Nationalism. 1995, London: Sage, p. 6.
2. Michael Skey and Marco Antonsich, Everyday Nationhood: theorising culture, identity and belonging after Banal Nationalism. 2017, London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 1.
3. Michel Billig, Banal Nationalism. 1995, London: Sage, p. 6.
4. Koch, Nathalie; Anssi Paasi (September 2016). "Banal Nationalism 20 years on: Re-thinking, re-formulating and re-contextualizing the concept". Political Geography. 54: 1–6. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2016.06.002.
5. Sophie Duchesne, 'Who's afraid of Banal Nationalism', Nations and Nationalism, 2018, 24, pp. 841-856.
6. Penrose, Jan (November 2011). "Designing the nation. Banknotes, banal nationalism and alternative conceptions of the state". Political Geography. 30 (8): 429–440. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.09.007.
7. Piller, Ingrid (12 May 2017). "The banal nationalism of intercultural communication advice". Archived from the original on 12 May 2017.
8. Mylonas, Harris; Tudor, Maya (11 May 2021). "Nationalism: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know". Annual Review of Political Science. 24 (1): 109–132. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-101841. Retrieved 27 September 2021. Wade, Lisa (4 July 2014). "Banal Nationalism". Sociological Images. Retrieved 16 October 2019.

In contrast to the oft-mentioned "hot" nationalisms which seem to plague far-off or obscure places like the Balkans, the Caucuses, etc., Billig introduces the concept of "banal" nationalism to refer to nationalism and the way this form of identity politics is reinforced in stable, affluent and apparently "anational" societies, such as Great Britain or the United States.

This is not a consideration of fringe groups, but of societies as a whole. Billig conducts an exemplary analysis into how identification with one's nation or country is reinforced on a daily basis in the most subtle and unnoticeable (and thus banal) manner: the weather maps in newspapers or on television which show one's country highlighted in a different color, currency or postage stamp containing patriotic motifs, pledging allegiance to the flag every morning by school children, etc. Billig's point is that this everyday, almost unconscious intake of psychologically loaded signs, symbols and signals can be one factor in explaining how easily people come to adopt irrational openly "patriotic" ways of thinking in times of crisis, whether real or perceived (as anyone who lived in the U.S. during the Gulf War can attest to).

There is also a good critique of the dichotomy created between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism, in that those who insist on this dichotomy usually tend to view the former as "good" while the latter is definitely "bad." Billig points out that both have the potential to become dangerously irrational. (Comment by Edward Bosnar)

While I love the ideas and observations presented by Billig, he didn't seem to be putting too much thought into those who would be reading his book. I kept getting the impression that he had about 50 pages worth of content, but was required to write 150 pages in order to please his publisher. The bulk of the book is repeating the same things over again in different words and it is written in very dry language. He also seems to tell things in the wrong order. He'll go on and on about a conclusion he has, but wait several chapters before he actually tells you the reasoning he used to reach that conclusion.

Despite all that, he has a message worth hearing, and at least considering. He describes how nationalism is not something that exists only in extreme circumstances, but how it's a part of everyday life that citizens take for granted. Well worth a read. Or at least a skim. (Comment by layla)

[Reading The psychology of nationalism]

Currently reading the Psychology of Nationalism

I’m reading The Psychology of Nationalism, by Joshua Searle-White, 2001. I’ll put general info here, rough notes here, and highlights in the timeline.

Unreflective partisanship

The term “nationalism” might be confusing. Nationalism can be a good thing and a bad thing, which means that that the term can not be used without qualification. When George Orwell wrote about nationalism in 1945, he seems to have intended it to mean: “unreflective partisanship”. That is much more to the point.

The W. article on Orwell’s “Notes on Nationalism” gives a short summary of his thoughts on this topic: https://web.archive.org/web/20230606043801/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Notes_on_Nationalism